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A while ago we looked at how Zoom was avoiding WebRTC by using WebAssembly to ship their own audio and video codecs instead of using the ones built into the browser’s WebRTC.  I found an interesting branch in Google’s main (and sadly mostly abandoned) WebRTC sample application apprtc this past January. The branch is named wartc… a name which is going to stick as warts!

The repo contains a number of experiments related to compiling the webrtc.org library as WebAssembly and evaluating the performance. From the rapid timeline, this looks to have been a hackathon project. ...  Continue reading

Thanks to work initiated by Google Project Zero, fuzzing has become a popular topic within WebRTC since late last year.  It was clear WebRTC was lacking in this area. However, the community has shown its strength by giving this topic an immense amount of focus and resolving many issues.  In a previous post, we showed how to break the Janus Server RTCP parser. The Meetecho team behind Janus did not take that lightly. They got to the bottom of what turned out to be quite a big project. In this post Alessandro Toppi of Meetecho will walk us through how they fixed this problem and built an automated process to help make sure it doesn’t happen again. ...  Continue reading

Note: as of March 2021 both experiments no longer work in Chrome.

QUIC-based DataChannels are being considered as an alternative to the current SCTP-based transport. The WebRTC folks at Google are experimenting  with it:

Let’s test this out. We’ll do a simple single-page example similar to the WebRTC datachannel sample that transfers text. It offers a complete working example without involving signaling servers and also allows comparing the approach to WebRTC DataChannels more easily. ...  Continue reading

Fuzzing is a Quality Assurance and security testing technique that provides unexpected, often random data to a program input to try to break it. Natalie Silvanovich from Google’s Project Zero team has had quite some fun fuzzing various different RTP implementations recently.

She found vulnerabilities in:

In a nutshell, she found a bunch of vulnerabilities just by throwing unexpected input at parsers. The range of applications which were vulnerable to this shows that the WebRTC/VoIP community does not yet have a process for doing this work ourselves. Meanwhile, the WebRTC folks at Google will have to improve their processes as well...  Continue reading

Echo cancellation is a cornerstone of the audio experience in WebRTC. Google has invested quite a bit in this area, first with the delay-agnostic echo cancellation in 2015 and now with a new echo cancellation system called AEC3. Debugging issues related to AEC3 is one of the hardest areas. Al Brooks from NewVoiceMedia ran into a case of seriously degraded audio reported from his customers’ contact center agents. After a lengthy investigation it turned out to be caused by a Chrome experiment that enabled the new AEC3 for a percentage of users in Chrome stable.
Al takes us through a recap of how he analyzed the problem and narrowed it down enough to file a bug with the WebRTC team at Google. ...  Continue reading

Deploying media servers for WebRTC has two major challenges, scaling beyond a single server as well as optimizing the media latency for all users in the conference. While simple sharding approaches like “send all users in conference X to server Y” are easy to scale horizontally, they are far from optimal in terms of the media latency which is a key factor in the user experience. Distributing a conference to a network of servers located close to the users and interconnected with each other on a reliable backbone promises a solution to both problems at the same time. Boris Grozev from the Jitsi team describes the cascading SFU problem in-depth and shows their approach as well as some of the challenges they ran into. ...  Continue reading


By david drexlerFlickr, CC BY 2.0, Link

Back in August, Reuters reported on a “secret legal fight” between the FBI and Facebook about wiretapping Messenger calls. The Verge as they found our old post about reverse-engineering Messenger from 2015 and had a number of follow-up questions on it for a Messenger wiretapping article they ran. Technical details on the case are quite hard to find so I was not able to dig deeper into the specifics around wiretapping.

Reuters now reports that Facebook will not be forced to wiretap Messenger calls with the FBI noting: ...  Continue reading

Simulcast is one of the more interesting aspects of WebRTC for multiparty conferencing. In a nutshell, it means sending three different resolution (spatial scalability) and different frame rates (temporal scalability) at the same time. Oscar Divorra’s post contains the full details.

Usually, one needs a SFU to take advantage of simulcast. But there is a hack to make the effect visible between two browsers — or inside a single page. This is very helpful for single-page tests or fiddling with simulcast features, particular the ability to enable only certain spatial layers or to control the target bitrate of a particular stream. ...  Continue reading

The Chrome Webstore has decided to stop allowing inline installation for Chrome extensions. This has quite an impact on WebRTC applications since screensharing in Chrome currently requires an extension. Will the getDisplayMedia API come to the rescue?

Screensharing in Chrome

When screensharing was introduced in Chrome 33, it required implementation via an extension as a way to address the security concerns. This was better than the previous experience of putting this capability behind a flag which lead to sites asking their users to change that flag… that got those sites an official yikes...  Continue reading

We have covered the “WebRTC is leaking your IP address” topic a few times, like when I reported what the NY Times was doing and in my WebRTC-Notifier. Periodically this topic comes up now and again in the blogosphere, generally with great shock and horror. This happened again recently, so here is an updated look into this alleged issue.

The recent blog post titled VPN Leak by voidsec highlighting how 19 out of more than 100 VPN services tested “leak” IP addresses via WebRTC is a quite interesting read. Some of the details about WebRTC are not quite correct the results are interesting nonetheless. At is core this is someone who sat down to test a long list of services and their behaviour, one by one. This is not the most exciting research task, but exhaustive studies like this often find something interesting. ...  Continue reading